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1 Introduction 
In order to improve exploitation patterns and reduce the problem of discards, Norway has 
over the years established a set of regulations and management measures. The main objective 
is to promote an exploitation pattern where recruits and undersized fish are spared, and where 
unwanted by-catch can be minimized. This is being achieved through several interconnected 
measures which could be referred to as the "Discard Ban Package".  
Minimizing unwanted by-catch that might otherwise be discarded is relevant in relation to 
conservation as well as economical or distributional aspects of fishing activities.  The term 
unwanted may in this context encompass by-catches of threatened species as well as species 
without economic interest to the fisher, and also species for which that particular fisher or 
fleet group does not hold a quota or fishing right.  
Norway introduced a discard ban on cod and haddock in 1987, for both economic and ethical 
reasons. The very existence of the ban has been beneficial in changing fisher’s attitudes and 
discouraging the practice of discarding. The discard ban was gradually expanded to new 
species, and from 2009 an obligation to land all catches was introduced (with certain 
exemptions). It should be noted that the ban applies to dead or dying fish, viable fish can be 
released back to the sea. The discard ban was preceded by a program of real time closures of 
fishing areas (RTCs) which was developed from 1984 onwards. 
Area closure is a well developed measure in fisheries as well as environmental management. 
In fisheries management closed areas may basically be grouped into two main categories, 
namely:  
a) Permanently closed areas  
Such areas may be closed all the year round or seasonally, for all or particular gears, and for a 
variety of reasons – nursery areas, coral reefs, trawler-free zones to prevent conflicts between 
gears, lobster habitats etc. etc. 
b) Real time closures – RTCs  
These are areas where the number of undersized fish, or level of by-catches, exceeds 
permitted limits and hence, are temporarily closed. Real time closures have turned out to be 
an effective tool in situations where unwanted intermixture vary from year to year and/or with 
respect to time and place. Seen from the fishers’ perspective and that of economic efficiency, 
it is a flexible measure compared to permanent closures, allowing fishing to take place in a 
controlled and sustainable manner when not in conflict with economic and conservation 
objectives. 
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The program for closing and opening of areas on a real time basis in the Barents Sea was 
developed from 1984 onwards to avoid the catching of undersized fish and by-catches of 
protected species. Similar but less comprehensive programs are now emerging for the North 
Sea and Skagerrak, in a dialog between EU and Norway. 
2 The Barents Sea program for Real Time Closures 
The background for establishing this program was that after seven consecutive weak year-
classes combined with a too high fishing pressure, the Northeast Arctic cod stock was in a 
very poor condition. Then, finally, in 1983 a strong year-class occurred. Experiences from the 
1960s and 1970s showed that strong year-classes would be grossly reduced through excessive 
discarding, already in its first years of life in the trawl fishery for shrimp, and during the 
following years also in the trawl fishery for cod and haddock.  The big issue at the time was: 
what if seven new, lean years were to occur after 1983? Immediate steps had to be taken to 
make sure that this precious year-class could survive and contribute to the spawning stock and 
to the economically important cod fisheries in years to come. The solution was the 
establishment of a program for temporary, real time closures of fishing grounds, a program 
which during 1984–1986 successfully contributed to the protection of the strong 1983 year-
class through its most vulnerable juvenile phase. 
 
2.1 Financing and operating of the Barents Sea program 
Later on the program has been further developed, and nowadays the commercially most 
important fisheries of the region are covered by the program. Commercial fishing vessels are 
hired to investigate the fishing grounds, with specially assigned and trained inspectors on 
board; most of them have their professional background from fisheries. The financing of the 
program is twofold. The hiring of fishing vessels is financed by the industry, as a total of 4600 
tonnes of cod, haddock and saithe is set aside from TACs and given as quota bonus/payment 
to fishing vessels participating in the program. The cost of 18 inspectors and the running of 
the program, approximately 20 million NOK or 2.7 million EUR per year, are funded by the 
government (all data refer to 2012). The program is operated by the Surveillance Service, a 
branch of the Directorate of Fisheries’ regional office in Tromsø. 
The annual work plan of the Surveillance Service is based on a risk assessment where in 
addition to expected fleet activity, important input come from science with regard to expected 
changes in stocks and year-class strength. Based on the risk assessment, decisions are made 
with regard to how many days of different vessel categories should be hired for the next year. 
Rental of vessel days follow public tender procedures, and one important element in the 
selection is that the vessels are representative of the relevant segment of the fishing fleet with 
regard to gear technology, engine power etc. 
 
2.2 Criteria for closures 
Specific criteria relating to intermixture of juveniles and level of by-catches are laid down in 
the relevant fisheries regulations as basis for closure (Anon., 2012a). In the shrimp fishery the 
criteria are a maximum permitted number of cod, haddock, redfish and Greenland halibut 
respectively, per 10 kg of shrimp. The permitted numbers are presently 8 cod, 20 haddock and 
for redfish and Greenland halibut the number is 3 of each per 10 kg of shrimp. The criteria for 
cod and haddock are based on bioeconomic modeling where the value of present shrimp 
catches is balanced against future losses in economic yield of cod and haddock (Veim et al. 
1994).  The stocks of redfish and Greenland halibut have been in a precarious state for a long 
time, and for these species the criteria are more restrictive, based on the precautionary 
approach and biodiversity considerations. However, the situation for these stocks has been 
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gradually improving, and the criteria are therefore presently being revised. Also the 
bioeconomic criteria need to be revised from time to time, due to changes in relative prices 
and other relevant model parameters. 
In the trawl fishery targeting cod, haddock and saithe a combined maximum per haul of 15 % 
of juveniles (fish below their respective minimum sizes) of the said species are allowed. The 
criterion is measured in numbers of fish, not kilos. For inspectors and for fishers (ref. section 
4.3 and the move-on provision), it is operationally easier to count the fish than to weigh them. 
Furthermore, a limit measured in kilos instead of numbers of fish would have to be 
considerable higher than 15 % to provide the same level of protection of juveniles. The 15 % 
limit, based on biological considerations, was introduced together with the program of RTCs 
in 1984. 
In addition to the criteria already mentioned, which are the most important with respect to 
triggering real time closures, several other by-catch criteria do exists related to specific 
fisheries or stocks, for example to minimize the intermixture of cod in capelin fisheries, or the 
intermixture of protected redfish in cod fisheries. 
 
2.3 Procedures for closing areas – notification and communication to the fleet 
Procedures are established with regard to sampling and delimiting the area to be closed. 
Accordingly, when investigations from the Surveillance Service reveal that one or more 
criteria are exceeded, the area will be closed. Delimitation is based on actual occurrence of 
juveniles or by-catches, not for example on a predetermined grid size. As a consequence, a 
closure may be quite extensive and non-rectangular in size. The formal decision on closure is 
made by the Head Office of the Directorate of Fisheries in Bergen in the form of legally 
binding regulation, based on advice from the Regional Office in Tromsø. Normally, the 
regulations will be adopted and enter into force within hours, not days, after sampling took 
place. 
 
The regulations are communicated in Norwegian to the fleet through the Norwegian Radio 
(NRK) which has a daily service where short, important messages to the fleet may be 
distributed. In addition it is also communicated to the fleet from relevant coastal radio stations 
through channel 16. The regulations, in (Norwegian and English), are also published on web 
pages of the Directorate of Fisheries accompanied (in Norwegian) by a map of the closed 
area, the data on a haul by haul basis from the trial fishery leading up to the closure, and the 
Surveillance Service’s summary/evaluation from the trial fishery. Furthermore, the decision is 
also published in Russian on the web pages.  
 
When an area is closed it affects all fishing vessels immediately that have got the relevant 
information. With regard to foreign vessels, a formal notification procedure through 
diplomatic channels has to be followed. This may in practice take a week or more. In order to 
speed up the process, a copy of the decision is, by bilateral agreement, simultaneously but 
informally sent from the Directorate of Fisheries to fisheries authorities in Russia, EU, Faroe 
Islands, Iceland and Greenland. However, normally the Coast Guard or the Surveillance 
Service will inform vessels fishing in the relevant area directly by radio communication about 
the closure. If a foreign vessel continues fishing until it is notified by its own authorities, it is 
warned that it may be inspected, as continuation of fishing without violating the rules is 
probably impossible. Hence, the real time closures are normally respected immediately by all 
fishing vessels, irrespectively of flag and formal notification procedures. In situations with 
many fishing vessels present and a high fishing intensity, rapid closure and compliance are 
essential for the protection of juveniles. 
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The decisions on relevant areas to investigate are based on accumulated experience of the 
Surveillance Service and on updated information from scientists, the Coast Guard and the 
fishing fleet. Closed areas are re-examined after some time to control whether there is still a 
basis for keeping them closed. The time-lag between closure and reexamination is determined 
case by case based on experience from similar situations. If the intermixture of juveniles in 
the catches no longer exceeds the permitted levels, the closed areas are reopened for fisheries. 
In many cases the re-examination may justify an amendment to the extent of the closed area. 
The annual number of closures, amendments and re-openings depends first of all on the 
relative strength of year classes of relevant stocks, and may vary between 30 and up to 70 
annually. 
 
In advance of a closure the Coast Guard has the possibility, if present at the fishing ground, to 
establish a “Precautionary Area”. When set out in the map and communicated to the fleet 
present, this serves as a warning that fishing in the specified area most likely will imply 
violating regulations. The area is not formally closed, but it might never the less have legal 
consequences to fish inside it. 
 
Figure 1 and 2 shows the large variation in size and extension of closed areas, and also the 
major changes over time, here illustrated by changes during 6 months in 2005. 
 
               
   Figure 1: Closed areas in April 2005                                               Figure 2: Closed areas in October 2005 
 
 
2.4 Acceptance by stakeholders of real time closures 
The concept of closure and opening of areas is generally regarded, including the industry, as 
an important instrument for achieving rational exploitation patterns in the fisheries in these 
areas. Seen from a conservation perspective, no negative side effects are observed with regard 
to the method of closing areas with undersized fish or to high by-catch levels. As a regulatory 
measure it is generally recognised and respected by fishers, with whom it has gained a fairly 
high degree of legitimacy. The reason for this is that closing of areas with small fish or too 
high by-catch levels creates a level playing field and prevents behaviour which is contrary to 
fishers’ professional code of conduct, as fishers in general accept that catching (and 
discarding) fish below accepted minimum size is unprofessional and morally wrong.  
 
It has been argued that instead of formal closures one could rely on some sort of self-policing 
whereby fishers voluntarily would leave areas with large numbers of juveniles. Although a 
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move-on provision does exist, see section 4.3, experience shows that this is not enough in 
practice. The law-abiding fisher will experience that colleagues with a more relaxed attitude 
towards rules and regulations continue fishing and become the economic winners. Where high 
moral compete with economic return the moral tends to lose out. A formal closure policed by 
government does however, create the level playing field. 
 
From time to time fishers complain that the Surveillance Service is too slow in reexamining a 
closed area. This is first of all a question of finding the right balance between fishers’ 
understandable impatience, and the concerns of government related to the cost/efficiency of 
the Surveillance Service. Automatic reopening of closed areas is considered not feasible in the 
Barents Sea as experience show that when intermixture of juveniles occurs, it may often 
prevail for a longer, indefinite period (often months rather than weeks). Accordingly, the 
occurrence of juveniles or by-catches must be assessed in each individual case. 
 
The rules of RTC programs may differ, both due to differences in natural conditions as well as 
to objectives and ambitions set for the program. In the emerging RTC program for the North 
Sea and Skagerrak, EU and Norway have so far not managed to harmonize the relevant rules 
and criteria. Both parties do apply automatic reopening after 14 days, but agreement has not 
been reached with regard to the size (predetermined or not) of closed areas and whether limits 
should be measured in kilos or numbers.  
 
2.5 Cooperation with Russia 
Most stocks of the Barents Sea are shared and managed jointly between Norway and Russia. 
There is a common understanding between the parties that as a part of a responsible 
management, protection of juveniles is essential. The criteria and procedures for RTCs have 
been discussed and agreed in cooperation between the two parties. Both parties have a ban on 
discarding in their legislation. 
 
3 The introduction of a discard ban 
Returning to the strong 1983 year-class of cod; in late 1986 and early 1987 this year-class 
reached the then minimum landing size, and the basis for area closures was no longer present. 
However, alarming messages from both inspectors and the fishing fleet indicated that a 
practice with extensive high-grading was now emerging. Fishers would fill their quotas with 
the largest, best paid fish and discard the smaller but still legally sized fish. What they were 
doing was perfectly legal under the existing laws and regulations.   
As described above, a considerable effort had already been put into saving this particular 
year-class, and subsequent year-classes were reported to be poor. The Minister of Fisheries at 
that time, Mr. Bjarne Mørk-Eidem, was naturally very upset: "This is terrible", he said, and 
his experts answered, "Yes, Minister, it is really terrible."  And he went on, saying, "We must 
do something, we have to ban this practice."  But the experts said, "Ah, well – no, Minister, 
that is not possible.  There are all sorts of legal problems, not least internationally. But first 
and foremost, a discard ban is more or less impossible to enforce."  However, the Minister 
would not give in: "This practice is both economic madness and morally wrong – I know it, 
you know it, and so do the fishers.  Even if it is hard to enforce, at least it should not be legal 
to do what they are doing.  Therefore, no more discussion, make me a discard ban!" And 
subsequently the ban on discard of dead or dying cod and haddock came into force in April 
1987. 
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This story is an example of political leadership. When his experts were stuck in conventional 
thinking, the Minister pointed out the direction for a new and sustainable policy in this field. 
Over the next twenty years the ban on discarding of dead or dying fish was gradually 
extended to include new species, and by 2008 a total of 18 species were comprised by the no-
discard policy. On January 1, 2009 the old Act relating to Seawater Fisheries was replaced by 
a new Marine Resources Act (Anon., 2008), and at the same time the discard ban was made 
the general norm. The preceding act related only to fisheries and focused mainly on the 
exploitation of commercial stocks, whereas the new act applies to all living marine resources. 
After initial adjustments the following years, by 2012 the ban comprises approximately 55 
species. Some further adjustments for low value species could be expected in order to adapt 
the discard policy to some of the practical realities that encounters the fishing fleet. 
 
3.1 Enforcement and sanctions of the discard ban 
Discarding is an offense which may be difficult to detect. Annually the Coast Guard and the 
Directorate of Fisheries do however detect some cases. Both the master of the vessel and the 
owner may be fined. In severe cases, for example if it is revealed that discarding is an integral 
part of the vessels “ordinary” production process, the fishing licence may be withdrawn for a 
period, in addition to considerably higher fines than for the minor cases. In severe cases the 
total catch onboard may, depending on the evidence, be considered illegal and its value 
confiscated by the prosecuting authority or by the court, in a separate decision. The Coast 
Guard in cooperation with the Public Prosecutor have over the years succeeded with how to 
collect evidence in discard cases to satisfy the Norwegian judicial system, so that it is possible 
to get convictions in the Court of Law. This implies that approximately half a dozen 
skippers/companies are fined yearly. The level of fines are around 15 – 25000 NOK for the 
skipper and in addition up to 150.000 NOK to the company which owns the vessel. 
 
3.2 What about damaged fish etc. – are there any exemptions to the discard ban? 
The regulations relating to seawater fisheries (Anon., 2012a) specifies the species for which 
the discard ban applies. Neither the act, nor the regulations include any formal exemptions 
from this ban. However, in practical life it is not possible to avoid all situations where fish is 
damaged to an extent where it is no longer fit for human consumption. Examples are fish 
stuck in meshes or fish partly consumed by other marine organisms. To retain such fish on 
board may result in practical problems. The amount of fish damaged for such reasons during a 
fishery conducted with due care to all applicable regulations is however very low. The 
authorities have thus acknowledged that these practical problems have to be dealt with. It is 
concluded not within reach to list all possible situations and set limits in a regulation that will 
give the desired result, hence a pragmatic solution has been found.  Under the Norwegian 
legal system the enforcement agencies have the authority to decide whether an infringement 
shall be followed up. Based on this authority a customary practice has been developed 
whereby discarding of fish damaged in the fishing operation and unfit for human 
consumption, is not prosecuted by the enforcement agencies. This also applies to cut off 
according to legal conversion factors, and to the smallest juvenile fish not being sorted out by 
the sorting grid in shrimp trawl, as long as the number of juveniles pr. kilo shrimp caught is 
within the legal limit. 
 
4 Accompanying measures to facilitate the discard ban 
A commonly asked question with regard to the Norwegian discard policy is how to handle all 
the “illegal” catches that are now supposedly landed. Questions like this tend to overlook the 
fact that at the core of the policy is the combined set of measures; discard ban, obligation to 
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change fishing ground, RTCs, the tailoring of quota regulations, gear restrictions and 
minimum fish and mesh sizes, and the development of more selective gears – all aiming at 
reducing the amount of unwanted catches in the first place. The accompanying measures are 
discussed below. 
 
4.1 Compensation to fishers for landing of “illegal” catches 
Although there is no doubt that the extent of unwanted catches in Norwegian fisheries has 
been greatly reduced; it is a well substantiated fact that discarding still occurs. Sometimes it 
occurs deliberately and as a result of an intended and unlawful harvest strategy, but 
sometimes to dispose of an unintended by-catch. As an incentive to land the unintended catch 
instead of discarding it, fishers may apply for compensation for the extra work in handling 
and landing the fish. The “illegal” catches may be sold together with the rest of the catch and 
through ordinary market outlets. However, as all firsthand sales and all payments for fish by 
law are channelled through one of the six Norwegian fishermen’s sales organizations, the 
value of the “illegal” part of the catch is held back by the sales organization. Nevertheless, 
20% of the value of the “illegal” catch may be paid to the fisher as compensation for his extra 
work. In purse seine fisheries for mackerel, herring and capelin this 20 % rule was abandoned 
as it turned out to be a too strong incentive for vessels to exceed their quota by “filling up” on 
the last trip.  
 
The sales organizations are allowed to keep the confiscated 80 % of the value and use the 
money on their lawful duties related to fisheries control, which include the collection and 
revision of all data related to first hands sales of fish in Norway, among others. 
 
Generally the landings of “illegal” fish do not represent a large amount of fish or a significant 
logistic problem. Some challenges have however been encountered by fishers complying with 
the discard ban and landing certain species of low or no market value. The occasional and 
unintended by-catch of polar cod in the shrimp fishery is an example in this regard. 
 
4.2 From minimum landing sizes of fish to minimum fishing sizes of fish 
Historically an important element when deciding on minimum mesh sizes in trawl have been 
the objective of utilizing the growth potential of the individual fish, and letting the fish spawn 
at least once before it is caught. The minimum landing sizes of fish have often been set at 
levels where on average 75 % of the fish below that size are supposed to swim through the 
meshes, whereas 25 % are captured (and discarded if the minimum landing size is enforced). 
The introduction of a discard ban led to a conceptual change with regard to the interpretation 
and function of allowed minimum sizes of fish.  The minimum sizes of the fish actually fished 
have replaced the minimum landing sizes in technical regulations, for example being crucial 
elements in the decision rules for RTCs.  The focus on reduction of potential discards has also 
been an invitation to revisit, and if possible harmonize or improve, the connection between 
mesh sizes, allowed minimum fish sizes and the actual commercial minimum market sizes. 
For targeted fisheries there is for example no evident reason why allowed minimum size of 
fish should be lower than the minimum size which is accepted in the commercial market. 
Hence, it should be considered to increase the minimum mesh size in trawl accordingly. For 
mixed fisheries the situation is, admittedly, more complex.  
4.3 Obligation to change fishing ground – the move-on provision when limits of juveniles 
or by-catches are exceeded 
According to Norwegian legislation, it is prohibited to fish “illegal” fish, unlike a prohibition 
limited to the landing of such fish. This prohibition constitutes an obligation for fishers to 
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change fishing ground when the fishing operations contravene regulations. For instance, if by-
catch limits or the permitted intermixture of undersized fish are exceeded, the fishing 
operation on the fishing ground in question must cease and the fisher must move to an area 
where, to the best of his knowledge, it is probable that the catch composition is within the 
limits of the relevant regulations. It is not expedient according to the Norwegian legal system 
to make this into a fixed rule, neither in depth nor distance in nautical miles. If the logbook or 
other sources of information reveals that the fisher has conducted more than one haul in the 
same area without moving, he will be subject to arrest/reporting to the police and the offence 
may be punished by fines. The catch in the relevant hauls is considered illegally caught, and 
its value confiscated by the prosecuting authority or the court in a decision separate from the 
fine. If illegal catch is mixed with legal catches on board the vessel, the total catch may be 
considered illegal and its value thus confiscated. 
 
If the fisher has acted in compliance with the move-on provision, there is no offence. The 
value of the part of the catch being in excess of permitted limits will however be subject to 
confiscation through an administrative decision by the Directorate of Fisheries.  
 
It should be noted that it is a crucial element of the anti-discard policy that fishing logbooks 
are required to be recorded and reported on a haul by haul basis. 
 
4.4 Tailoring of national quota regulations 
Different ways to regulate fisheries by means of quotas may provide different incentives with 
regard to discarding. As a consequence of the introduction of a discard ban the government 
was forced to re-think its practises, not only with regard to technical regulations, but also with 
regard to national quota regulations. Reducing inherent regulatory incentives to discarding, 
such as quotas per trip or week, was important. Weekly quotas face the fisher with a weekly 
temptation to discard excess catches in the last haul, whereas annual quotas limit that 
temptation to once a year. 
Allocation of quotas to cover expected unavoidable by-catches in non-direct fisheries, before 
remaining national quotas are allocated to vessels licensed to target the said specie, is another 
important measure taken. In addition the by-catch allocation must be reconciled with the 
allowed by-catch limits, and the government must refrain from “solving” distributional issues 
by implicitly accepting fishers to discard excess catches. By-catch allocations are now 
common in many Norwegian fisheries; North Sea cod in saithe and shrimp trawling, saithe in 
Norway pout trawling, blue whiting in the herring fishery etc. etc. 
 
Small coastal vessels fishing with passive gears have limitations with regard to mobility and 
the ability to change fishing ground. In some of the fisheries carried out by these vessels 
actual by-catches may vary considerably from setting to setting or from day to day. In such 
cases by-catch limits may be set for a longer period, for example a week, to reduce incentives 
to discard. 
 
4.5 Development of selective gear technology 
The focus on the discard problem and in particular the regulations introduced to minimize the 
problem, have had a beneficial influence on the research and development of more selective 
gears. The introduction of grid technology both in shrimp and cod trawls (compulsory north 
of 62N from 1991 and 1997 respectively) are examples of this spin-off effect created first of 
all by the real time closures. The industry took an active part in this development when large 
areas were closed due to too large intermixtures of juveniles. With sorting grids still at a test 
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stage, fishers could get an exemption to fish in closed areas provided they used sorting grid. 
To this end closures turned out to be far more effective and instrumental to innovation than 
years of traditional, publicly financed research on selectivity. The successful use of grids in 
the test phase paved the way for the agreement between Norway and Russia to make the use 
of grids compulsory throughout the Barents Sea. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3                                                                                      Figure 4 
 
The introduction of the discard ban and RTCs has led to a creative pressure on science, 
management and industry to contribute to innovations in order to improve selectivity and 
reduce unwanted by-catches. 
 
5 Gains from improvements in exploitation pattern 
Below, Northeast Arctic cod is used to illustrate potential gains from improvements in 
exploitation patterns. Figure 5 shows the yield of Northeast Arctic cod as a function of age at 
catch. With an initial stock of 1000 three year old cod all caught immediately, the total yield 
amounts to 724 kg live weight. If catch is postponed until the fish is nine years old, many of 
the initial 1000 fishes have died from natural mortality but still, due to individual growth of 
the remaining fish, the total yield has nearly doubled to 1337 kg. The figure illustrates core 
issues with regard to potential gains from improvements in exploitation patterns. 
 
Exploitation pattern – growth overfishing
Northeast Arctic Cod – Yield as a function of age at capture
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Cod – the benefits of increased average age at landing
1950-
1959
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5,84 5,30 5,03 5,35 5,64 5,64
Average age of landings
The increase in annual long term yield when average age of 
landings improved from 5,03 to 5,64 is 6,3%
Actual cod quota in 2012  :  772 000 tons
Quota reduced by   6,3%  : 723 000 tons
Estimate of annual benefit:   49 000 tons x NOK 11,42 = NOK 560 million
 
Figure 5                                                                                         Figure 6      
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Figure 6 illustrates how the selectivity of the Barents Sea cod fisheries deteriorated from the 
1950s to the 1970s, but later improved thanks to the continuous and combined efforts to 
improve exploitation patterns since the 1980s. Important milestones in this regard are 
illustrated in figure 7.  
Exploitation pattern – the Northeast Arctic cod and 
haddock – jointly managed by Norway and Russia
• Ban on fishing with midwater trawl (1980)
• If total number of undersized cod and haddock in any one haul 
exceed 15 %, fishers have an obligation to move (1984)
• Real time closures of areas with a high intermixture of juveniles 
(1984)
• Discard ban for cod and haddock (1987) 
• Mandatory sorting grid in shrimp trawl – 19 mm bar spacing (1991) 
• Mandatory sorting grid in cod trawl – 55 mm bar spacing (1997)
• Agreement on common minimum mesh size 130 mm in trawl (2010)
• Agreement on common minimum size of cod 44 cm (2010)
 
Figure 7 
 
Based on data from ICES Arctic Fisheries Working Group reports (Anon., 2012b) the average 
age at landing of Northeast Arctic Cod decreased from 5.84 in the 1950s to 5.03 in the 1970s, 
and then increased again to 5,64 in the period 2000-2010. The increase of 0.61 year in average 
age of landings since the 1970s represents all things equal, a 6.3% increase in annual yield. 
Applied to the 2012 TAC of cod of 772 000 tonnes, this amounts to 49 000 tonnes to a 
firsthand value of approximately NOK 560 million or EUR 75 million, based on average 
Norwegian first hand prices in 2011. Although this calculation is based on simplified 
assumptions, it illustrates the substantial gains which might accrue from improvements in 
exploitation patterns. Also note, as this calculation is based on change in average age of 
landings, it does not include the gains reaped from reduced levels of discards. In the absence 
of reliable data on historical discard levels these gains are not possible to calculate separately.  
It is however likely, with knowledge of the history of the Barents Sea fisheries, and with 
reference to similar fisheries were discard data do exist, that these gains no doubt have been 
considerable. 
 
6 Development of spawning stock and total landings of Northeast Arctic cod and 
haddock 1980 – 2011 
The development in spawning stock (SSB) and in total landings may however be used as 
indicators of the overall successfulness of management; SSB representing the stock fortune 
and total landings the annual yield or income from that fortune. The development of these two 
indicators is basically influenced by a combination of three factors; development in 
environmental conditions and variability, in exploitation pattern and in exploitation level. 
Management may control the two latter ones, but it is more than difficult to adequately 
separate the effect from each of the three factors. With regard to exploitation levels there have 
been a positive development for Barents Sea stocks over the last 5-10 years, both with regard 
to bringing an excessive IUU-fishing under control, and with the introduction of 
precautionary Harvest Control Rules, reducing fishing mortality levels from 2005 and 
onwards. The average annual spawning stock, landings and fishing mortality for Northeast 
Arctic cod and haddock for the two periods 1980-89 and 2007-2011 are given in the table 
below for comparison. The precautionary reference points Bpa and Fpa for SSBs and fishing 
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mortalities respectively are included as references. All data refer to ICES Advice 2012 
(Anon., 2012b). 
 
 
Northeast Arctic cod       1980-1989   2007-2011    Bpa and Fpa values 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Mean annual SSB         210        1160    460 
(1000 tonnes) 
Mean annual landings       374          571 
(1000 tonnes) 
Mean F ages 5-10      0, 82        0, 28   0, 40 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Northeast Arctic haddock 
Mean annual SSB     70          292     80 
(1000 tonnes) 
 
Mean annual landings    71          215    
(1000 tonnes) 
Mean F ages 4-7   0, 43         0, 34   0, 47 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
For both stocks a significant reduction in fishing mortality has been achieved since the 1980s. 
SSBs have increased four to fivefold giving room for large, but yet sustainable increases in 
TACs and landings. 
   
In conclusion; the positive development in Barents Sea fisheries since the 1980s cannot be 
attributed to one or a few causes or measures. It is brought about by a suite of measures in 
combination with favorable natural conditions. The lesson learnt is that a prudent 
management regime should give attention to and investigate possible improvements both in 
exploitation patterns as well as in exploitation levels. Stakeholders’ acceptance of the change 
of policy has grown over time, and it could be argued that it has led to changes in the 
perception on how the fisheries should best be exercised. 
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